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COMMENTS
Requirement of Substantial Constitutional Question
in Federal Three-Judge Court Cases
The United States Code 1 provides that an interlocutory or

permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of any state
statute by restraining the action of any officer of such state in
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1952) : "Injunction against enforcement of State statute,
three judge court required. An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining
the enforcement, operation, or execution of any State statute by restraining the
.action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute
or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State
statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the
ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor
is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of
[813]
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the enforcement of such statute shall not be granted unless the
application therefor is heard and determined by a district court
of three judges. There is ample authority that before this provision will be applicable the complaint must present a substantial
claim of unconsfitutionality2 Several recent race relations cases 8
may have misapplied this requirement and created in effect an
additional requirement that the statute attacked in the complaint
be not clearly unconstitutional. Under the holdings in these
cases a three-judge court, once convened, may remand a case
to the district court for decision when the statute attacked is
clearly unconstitutional, or the district court may refuse to convene a three-judge court initially for this same reason. The
purpose of this Comment is to discuss the history and development of the three-judge court provision to determine the validity
of the requirement and procedure adopted in these cases.
The requirement of a three-judge court was enacted by Congress as a compromise measure, following the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young. 4 It was there held
that the actions of a state official, even though taken directly
pursuant to and authorized by a state statute, could be enjoined
by a federal court if it was alleged that the statute under which
the official was acting was repugnant to the United States Conthis title." 62 STAT. 968, c. 646, § 1 (1948). (The former statute providing for
the three-judge court when the constitutionality of a state's action was. questioned
was Section 266 of the Judicial Code. The present Section 2281 of Title 28, USC,
is with minor modifications the same section.)
2. See California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938)
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) ; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R.,
282 U.S. 10 (1930) ; Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926). See page 821 infra
for a discussion of these cases.
3. See Board of Supervisors of LSU v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958)
Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of LSU, 225 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958) ;
Garman v. Miami Transit Co., 151 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Fla. 1957); Adkins v.
School Board of City of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957) ; Bush
v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1956). See page 826
infra for a discussion of these cases.
4. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This was an original application for a writ of habeas
corpus. The legislature of Minnesota passed an act fixing maximum rates for intrastate commerce. An injunction was sought in the federal district court against the
enforcement of the statute on the ground that it violated the Federal Constitution.
The Minnesota Attorney General, Edward T. Young, moved to dismiss the action
on the ground that the suit was against the State of Minnesota, which had not
consented to be sued. This motion was overruled, and a temporary injunction was
issued. Young refused to obey the injunction, and the federal district court convicted him for contempt. The United States Supreme Court denied the writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment,
which prohibits individual suits against a state, federal courts could issue injunctions against state officials seeking to enforce state statutes that violate the United
States Constitution.
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stitution. This decision evoked severe and widespread criticism. 5
It was felt that it was unseemly for a single district judge to
curtail the enforcement of statutes adopted by the state through
its legislature and high-ranking officers." In spite of this criticism, Congress did not see fit to divest the district courts of
jurisdiction entirely. By way of compromise the three-judge
court device was adopted 7 in the belief that the more careful
consideration afforded each case when it was considered by
three judges would minimize the possibility of arbitrary abuse
of the injunctive power. 8 As an additonal safeguard, review by
direct appeal to the Supreme Court was provided.9
5. For a detailed discussion of the indignity and injustice which it was felt was
being done to the states in having their solemn legislative acts, and the efforts of
state officers to enforce them, impeded by the interlocutory fiat of a single judge,
see Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HAlv. L. REv. 795 (1934).
6. State ire which was aroused by the Young decision is perhaps best expressed
in the words of Senator Overton, who sponsored the act which became Section 266
of the Judicial Code: "We think, sir, that if this [adopting Section 2661 could be
done, it would allay much of the feeling in the states. As was said by Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in the Minnesota case, we have come to a sad
day when one subordinate Federal Judge can enjoin the official of a sovereign
State from proceeding to enforce the laws of the State passed by the legislature
of his own State, and thereby suspending for a time the laws of the State ...
That being so [a suit against a state officer not a suit against the State] there
being great feeling among the people of the States by reason of the fact that one
federal judge has tied the hands of a sovereign and enjoined in this manner the
great officer who is charged with the enforcement of the laws of the State, causing
almost revolution, as it did in my State, and if this substitute is adopted and three
judges have to pass upon the question of the constitutionality of a State statute
and three judges say the statute is unconstitutional, the officers of the State will
be less inclined to resist the orders and decrees of our Federal Courts." 42 CoNG.
REc. 4846 et seq. (1908).
7. Act of March 3, 1911, 36 STAT. 1087, 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1952).
8. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., 260 U.S.
212, 216 (1922) : "The wording of the section leaves no doubt that Congress was
by provisions ex industria seeking to make interference . . . with the enforcement
of state regulations . . . regularly enacted and in course of execution, a matter of
the adequate hearing and the full deliberation which the presence of three judges
, * , was likely to secure. It was to prevent the improvident granting of such injunctions by a single judge, and the possible unnecessary conflict between federal
and state authority always to be deprecated."
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1952) : "Direct appeal from decisions of three-judge courts.
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act
of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges." 62
STAT. 926 (1948).
The major distinction between the 1911 three-judge courts and those as presently constituted is that the former were authorized to hear applications only
where interlocutory injunctions were sought, while the latter are authorized as
well to entertain applications where only permanent injunctions are sought. Various amendments have increased the jurisdiction of the three-judge court to include
orders of state boards or commissions as well as state statutes; to include petitions
for final as well as interlocutory injunctions; to add the analogous statute granting injunctive relief from the operation of unconstitutional federal statutes; and
to perfect the method of appeal to the United States Supreme Court. For a detailed discussion of the history of these statutes as well as the early case law
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The three-judge requirement, however, being in the form of

a compromise, has never been construed as a measure of broad
social policy, but rather as an enactment technical in the strict
sense of the term. 10 The courts have generally recognized the
narrow and technical character of the requirement and have
enunciated specific requisites for the formation of the special
three-judge court: (1) injunctive relief must be sought;1 (2)
the act in question must be attacked as repugnant to the United
States Constitution ;12 (3) the suit must seek to restrain an officer of the state.1 3 When these requisites are not present, the
construing them, see Pogue, State Determination of State Law and the Judicial
Code, 41 HARv. L. REV. 623 (1928) ; Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47
I-IARV. L. REV. 795 (1934) ; Bowen, When are Three Judges Required?, 16 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1931). See also The Three Judge Federal Court, 1 RACE REL. L. REP.

811 (1956).
10. In Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941), Mr. Justice Frankfurter expounded on the narrowness of application of the three-judge court statute: "It is a matter of history that this procedural device was a means of protecting the increasing body of state legislation regulating economic enterprise from
invalidation by a conventional suit in equity. While Congress thus sought to assure
more weight and greater deliberation by not leaving the fate of such litigation to
a single judge, it was no less mindful that the requirement of three judges . . .
entails a serious drain upon the federal judicial system. . . . Moreover, inasmuch
as this procedure also brings direct review of a district court to this Court, any
loose construction . . . would defeat the purpose of Congress . . . to keep within
narrow confines our appellate docket. . . . The history, . . . the narrowness of its

original scope, the piece-meal explicit amendments which were made to it . . .. the
close construction given the section in obedience to Congressional policy . . . combine to reveal [it] not as a measure of broad social policy to be construed with
great liberality, but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and
to be applied as such."
11. Public Service Comm. of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952) ; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U.S. 10 (1930) ; Smith v. Wilson, 273
U.S. 388 (1927) ; Moore v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 272 U.S. 317 (1926).
12. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941) ; Ex parte Bransford, 310
U.S. 354, 361 (1940) ("It is necessary to distinguish between a petition for injunction on the ground of the unconstitutionality of a statute as applied, which
requires a three-judge court, and a petition which seeks an injunction on the
ground of the unconstitutionality of the result obtained by the use of a statute
which is not attacked as unconstitutional. The latter petition does not require a
three-judge court.") ; Ex parte Hobbs, 280 U.S. 168 (1929). The phrase "any
statute" has been interpreted to include provisions of state constitutions. AFL v.
Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
Section 266 of the Judicial Code was amended by the Act of March 4, 1913, c.
160, 37 STAT. 1013, to include the words "enforcement or execution of an order
made by an administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to the
statute of such State." For the interpretation and application accorded this provision, see Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470 (1930) ; Herkness v. Irion, 278 U.S. 92 (1928) ; Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S.
290 (1923). See also Bowen, When Are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16
MINN. L. REv. 1, 10-14 (1931) for the discussion and cases there cited.
13. Injunction must be sought against the actions of state rather than purely
local officers. Ex parte Public Bank of New York, 278 U.S. 101 (1928) (municipal taxing officials not state officers within meaning of Section 266) ; EX parte,
Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928) (suit to restrain city from paving street and paying
for improvement with bond issue was not within scope of Section 266).
However, local officials have been held to be state officers within the meaning
of Section 266, if the statute which they seek to enforce embodies a policy of
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formation of a three-judge court is not required, and no direct
appeal will lie to the Supreme Court. 14 In the absence of any

of these requisites, the district judge may refuse to convene a
three-judge court since the suit is not the type that must be
heard by three judges. 15 However, whenever all of these requisites are present, the single district judge is without jurisdiction
to dismiss the bill on the merits or to grant either an interlocutory or permanent injunction.16
In addition to the three requisites above, the cases have
clearly developed a fourth requirement: that the claim of unconstitutionality be substantial. 17 In the language of one of the
decisions, the claim must present a substantial question of constitutionality.'5 This requisite appears to concern the jurisdiction of the court, not as a three-judge court as such, but as a
federal court generally. 19 Since the statute requires an allegation of unconstitutionality before the three-judge court provisions are applicable, it would seem necessarily to follow that the
jurisdiction of the three-judge court is predicated on district
court federal question jurisdiction. 20 Section 1331 of Title 28 of
state-wide concern. Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (district attorney of the County of New York was a state officer when he attempted
to enforce a New York statute making it a misdemeanor to violate any provisions
of a code of fair competition approved by the President of the United States under
the NIRA). Conversely state officials charged with duties under a statute not of
state-wide concern have been held not to be state officers within the purpose for
which Section 266 was designed. Rorick v. Commissioners, 307 U.S. 208 (1939)
(defendant officers, though state officials, were acting in the particular case in a
manner which concerned only a single taxing district).
14. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
15. Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940) ; Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565
(1928).
16. Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U.S. 10 (1930).
17. Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) ; California Water Co.
v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938) ; Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933) ;
Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U.S. 10 (1930) (the statute applies
only where there is a substantial claim of invalidity under the Federal Constitution) ; In re Buder, 271 U.S. 461, 467 (1926) ("a substantial claim of unconstitutionality is necessary for the application of section 266") ; Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 304 (1913) ("This statute applies to cases in which
the preliminary injunction is sought in order to restrain the enforcement of a state
enactment upon the ground of its 'unconstitutionality.' The reference, undoubtedly,
is to an asserted conflict with the Federal Constitution, and the question of unconstitutionality, in this sense, must be a substantial one." (Emphasis added.)).
18. "The existence of a substantial question of constitutionality must be determined by the allegations of the bill of complaint." (Emphasis added.) Ex parte
Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933).
19. Id. at 31 : "The provision requiring the presence of a court of three judges
necessarily assumes that the District Court has jurisdiction. In the absence of
diversity of citizenship, it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal
question should be presented."
20. The language of the decisions seem to support such a conclusion. California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 254 (1938) : "We have
held that Section 266 of the Judicial Code [28 USCA § 380] does not apply unless
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the United States Code 21 provides that "the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter
in controversy

.

.. arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties

of the United States." It was early decided that to sustain the
jurisdiction of federal courts in such cases, the question presented had to be substantial. 22 A discussion here of the substantial question requirement of federal question jurisdiction will
be helpful in understanding the problems raised in the recent
race relations cases. The language of Article III of the Constitution 23 extending federal judicial power to "cases arising
under" the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States
24
was given a broad scope in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.
It would seem a fair interpretation of that case that the jurisdiction of the district courts will be sustained if some right
relied on by the parties has its origin in federal law, even though
that right be not itself the subject of litigation. The same constitutional language which was interpreted by the court in the
Osborn case was subsequently used by Congress in granting
original federal jurisdiction to the district courts. 25 Although
the broad scope accorded this language in the Osborn case has
not been denied, 26 the courts have in many cases limited the
there is a substantial claim of the unconstitutionality of a state statute or administrative order as there described. It is, therefore, the duty of the district judge,
to whom an application for an injunction restraining the enforcement of a state
statute or order is made, to scrutinize the bill of complaint to ascertain whether a
substantial federal question is presented, as otherwise the provision for the convening of a court of three judges is not applicable." (Emphasis added.) See note
19 supra for the language used by the court in -*x parte Poresky.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1958) : "Federal question; amount in controversy;
costs. (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." Act of July 25, 1958, 72 STAT. 415.
22. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
289 U.S. 103 (1933) ; The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22
(1913) ; Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910) ; McGilvra v.
Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909) ; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority. .. ."
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The Osborn case held that the "arising
under" of Article III authorized the conferring of jurisdiction on the federal courts
over all suits brought by or against a congressionally chartered bank. Chief Justice
Marshall reasoned that such suits arose under federal law because in every such
case the questions of the bank's capacity to sue or to be sued, to contract, or to
make any legal move, had to be decided explicitly or taken for granted in order
for a decision to be made; such an issue was an "original ingredient" sufficient
to sustain the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1958). For the text of this provision see note 21
supra.
26. This was made clear by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Gully v. First Nat. Bank,
299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936): "Looking backward we can see that the early cases
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application of the statutory language. 2 The test formulated by
the courts in these latter cases for a case to meet the original
federal question jurisdiction of the district courts is that the
28
plaintiff's claim must be founded "directly" upon federal law
in a complaint properly pleaded.2 9 This differential treatment;
is said to be compelled by practical considerations." The poten-,
tial judicial power of the United States over federal questiopi
cases must necessarily be extremely broad. But to hold that the
federal trial courts are invested in every instance with virtually.
the full constitutional range of jurisdiction over federal questions might well flood the national courts with purely local state
matters, thereby deflecting them from their real function. 81 For
this same reason it has been required that the claim be not
frivolous or clearly untenable.32 If a clearly untenable assertion

of a federal right were sufficient to support the exercise of
judicial power, there would be no end to attempts to create
federal jurisdiction over state causes of action. Although it has
been asserted that dismissal by the district court because the
were less exacting than the recent ones. . . . If a federal right was pleaded, the
question was not always asked whether it was likely to be disputed. This is seen
particularly in suits by or against a corporation deriving its charter from an act
of Congress. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Pacific Railroad
Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1.. . . Partly under the influence of statutes disclosing
a new legislative policy, partly under the influence of more liberal decisions, the
probable course of the trial, the real substance of the controversy, has taken on a
new significance. 'A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of
the United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under
those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involve.
a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a
law, upon the determination of which the result depends.' Shulthis v. McDougal,
225 U.S. 561, 569. . . . Only recently we said after full consideration that the doctrine of the charter cases was to be treated as exceptional, though within their,
special field there was no thought to disturb them. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.
supra. [288 U.S. 476]."
27. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) ; Bell
v. Flood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ; Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).;:
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) ; Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S.
332 (1906) ; Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) ; Albright v.
Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1882).
28. See cases cited note 27 supra. This requirement that the claim be founded
"directly" upon national law is thoroughly discussed in Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953).
29. The controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint unaided
by the answer or by a petition for removal. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74
(1914) ; The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913) ; Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) ; Tennessee v. Union & Planters'.
Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
30. For a thorough discussion of the problem, see Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953).
31. Id. at 162.
32. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
289 U.S. 103 (1933); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22
(1913) ; Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910) ; McGilvra v.,
Ross, 215 U.S. 70 (1909) ; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
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complaint is frivolous or clearly untenable is a dismissal on the

merits,38 it seems to be well established that a substantial federal question is necessary to sustain the jurisdiction of the
court.3 4 This requirement that the claim be not frivolous or
clearly untenable appears to be the same requirement that has

been adopted in the three-judge court cases which require that
the claim of unconstitutionality be substantial.3 5 A lack of a sub-

stantial claim of unconstitutionality has been said to exist when
the complaint was obviously without merit or its unsoundness
so clearly resulted from previous decisions as to foreclose the
subject. 86 This is the same test which is employed by the district

courts in deciding whether the federal question presented is

frivolous or clearly untenable.3 7 Although in the earlier Supreme

Court decisions the requisite that the claim of unconstitutionality
be substantial was only hinted at by way of dictum, 38 in subsequent cases it was made the basis for decision.3 9 The procedure

adopted in these cases was for the three-judge court to dismiss
the complaint completely for want of jurisdiction.
It has likewise been established that a single district judge
may dismiss a complaint, even though a three-judge court is
requested when the claim of unconstitutionality is not substan33. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) ; The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty
Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913). Cf. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
34. However, it is not required that the claim necessarily be a valid one to
sustain jurisdiction. As long as the claim is not frivolous or clearly untenable,
the district court has jurisdiction if the federal claim is direct, even though the
court subsequently dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause
of action. Such a dismissal of the case is on the merits, and not for want of jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Similarly, it has been held that in a
suit involving both state and federal questions dismissed by the district court on
local or state grounds only is a dismissal on the merits, even though the court
decided the federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or omitted to
decide them altogether. Hurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
35. See notes 18, 19, and 20 supra, and accompanying text.
36. California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938)
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
37. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933) ; Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U.S. 70
(1909).
38. Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930) ; Ex parte
Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926) ; Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298
(1913).
39. California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252 (1938)
(plaintiff had alleged that certain federal grants to a city were unconstitutional
and that therefore the acts of the city officials in receiving such grants were
illegal. Between the time of filing of the suit and its hearing by the three-judge
court, a holding by the Supreme Court in another unconnected case had resolved
-the question of the constitutionality of the grants. The three-judge court dismissed the complaint on the ground that no substantial constitutional question
remained for consideration.). See also Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171
(1.939) ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
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tial. This is the result of the Supreme Court's decision in the
landmark case of Ex parte Poresky.40 In that case a motion to
dismiss for want of jurisdiction was heard by a single judge,
who held that since the bill did not present a substantial federal
question, jurisdiction was lacking, and dismissed the bill. The
Supreme Court denied mandamus, and held that since a substantial question of unconstitutionality was required before the
three-judge court requirement was applicable, 41 the district court
was required to examine the complaint and determine whether
jurisdictional requirements were met. In the absence of a substantial federal question, the district court was authorized to
in
dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction. The result reached
42
Poresky has been consistently adhered to by the courts.
Although the application of the rule announced in Ex parte
Poresky has been extensive, it has not gone without criticism.
Legal writers have been persistent in their assertion that the
rule as applied shakes the foundation of the three-judge requirement. 43 Thus it has been said that the rule permits a single
district judge to nullify the recognized intention of Congress
which was to insure careful and deliberate consideration of constitutional cases by a court of more dignity than the single judge
district court.44 This criticism is predicated on the well-established rule in three-judge cases that a federal district judge is
without authority to dismiss on the merits a suit involving the
constitutionality of a state statute. 45 In Ex parte Metropolitan
Water Co., 46 the first case involving an application of the three40. 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
41. The court cited Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926).
42. E.g., Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386
(1934) ; Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Waddell v. Chicago Land
Clearance Commission, 206 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1953); O'Rourke v. Waterfront
Commission, 118 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Sankstone v. Jarecki, 116F.
Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1953) ; Robinette v. Chicago Lana Clearance Commission, 115
F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1951) ; Blass v. Weigel, 85 F.Supp. 775 (D. N.J. 1949);
Acret v. Harwood, 41 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Cal. 1941) ; Wylie v. State Board of
Equalization, 21 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Cal. 1937).
43. See Berueffy, The Three Judge Federal Court, 15 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 64
(1943) ; Bowen, When Are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1931); Bowen, Federal Courts - Three-Judge Statutory Courts under Section
266 of the Judicial Code-Powers of the Single Judge, 28 MINN. L. REV. 131

(1943).

44. Berueffy, The Three Judge Federal Court, 15 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 64, 71

(1943).

45. Bowen, When Are Three Federal Judges Required?, 16 MINN. L. RBv. 1,

23 (1931).
46. 220 U.S. 539 (1911). In
266 of the Judicial Code literally
the power to grant a temporary
such relief. A writ of mandamus

that case the district judge interpreted Section
and held that while the statute deprived him of
injunction, it did not affect his power. to deM
was granted by the Supreme Court, which held
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judge requirement, the Supreme Court held that an application

for an interlocutory injunction must be heard before the enlarged court whether the claim of unconstitutionality was or was
not meritorous. This rationale was followed in Ex parte North48
ern Pacific RR.47 and in subsequent Supreme Court cases.
While these cases can be distinguished from Poresky on the
ground that in Poresky the court was deciding on a question of
jurisdiction and not on the merits, the distinction has been asserted to be more verbal than real. 49 In 1942 Congress passed
an:amendment to what is now Section 2284(5) of the Judicial
Code5" to provide that "a single judge shall not appoint a master
or order a reference, or hear and determine any application for,
an interlocutory injunction or motion to vacate the same, or dismiss the action, or enter a summary or final judgment." 5' 1 (Emphasis added.) It has been suggested that the intent of Congress
in passing this amendment was to preclude dismissals on the
ground of jurisdiction as well as on the merits.5 2 The Supreme
Court has not as yet ruled on this contention, but one appellate
court decision has found it to be without merit. 58 The district
that the purpose of the statute was to insure a full consideration of the merits by
the special court of three judges, and that therefore the single judge was without
jurisdiction to hear the cause on the merits.
47. 280 U.S. 142 (1929). That case concerned a petition for a temporary restraining order and an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of certain
rate orders issued by the Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana, which
petitioner alleged violated certain commerce laws and the Constitution of the
United States. One district judge granted the restraining order pending final
determination 'by a three-judge court, but before the court could be assembled
another judge dissolved this temporary order and dismissed on the merits. The
Supreme Court granted mandamus, holding that the single judge was without authority to hear either the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order or
the motion to dismiss the bill on the merits.
48. Ex parte Madden Bros. Inc., 283 U.S. 794 (1931) ; Stratton v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930) ; Ex parte Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 279
U.S. 822 (1929) ; Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n,
260 U.S. 212 (1922).
49. Berueffy, The Three Judge Federal Court, 15 RocKY MT. L. REV. 64, 71

(1943).
50. Act of April 6, 1942, c. 210, § 3, 56 STAT. 198-99.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2284.5 (Supp. 1958).
52. See Berueffy, The Three Judge Federal Court, 15 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 64
(1943) ; Bowen, Powers of the Single Judge, 28 MINN. L. REv. 131 (1943).
The legislative history reveals that one of the bar associations supporting this
provision stated that it would overrule Ex parte Poresky, and argued that such
a result was desirable so as to prevent the single judge from making a preliminary
determination of a statute's constitutionality. See H.R. Rep. No. 1677, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1942) (Report of Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
. 53. Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611, 614 (4th Cir. 1957) : "The rule laid down
in Ex parte Poresky . . . has not been changed by anything contained in 28 USC
§ 2284. That section was enacted to codify and clarify the practice with respect to
the. composition of and procedure before courts of three judges. Subsection 5 of
the section was manifestly intended to regulate procedure after the court of three
judges had. been constituted, not to abrogate the salutary rule that the judge before
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courts have in the meanwhile continued to apply the Poresky
54
rule.
The explanation for the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in
Ex parte Poresky would appear to lie in the area of general federal question jurisdiction. As already pointed out above, it was
early decided that to sustain the jurisdiction of the federal courts
in cases arising under the Federal Constitution, the claim presented had to be substantial. If a clearly untenable assertion
of federal right were sufficient to support the exercise of judicial
power there would be no end to attempts to create federal jurisdiction over state causes of action. These same policy considerations exist in three-judge cases. In addition, administrative
factors, such as time and expense in convening three-judge
courts, plus over-crowded court dockets, would militate in favor
of dispensing with the necessity of convening a three-judge court
when the plaintiff's allegation of unconstitutionality is clearly
without merit and perhaps but a subterfuge to secure federal
jurisdiction and direct appeal to the Supreme Court which is
permitted in three-judge cases. Granted that dismissal by the
district judge for lack of jurisdiction technically involves a
consideration of the merits, and that the distinction between
Poresky and the Metropolitan and Northern cases is actually
more verbal than real, practical considerations in the administration of three-judge courts would seem to justify this result. The
legislative intent in enacting the three-judge court statute is in
no way interfered with by the Poresky decision. The statute was
enacted as a compromise measure following the criticism of
Ex parte Young " that it was unseemly for a single district
judge to curtail the enforcement of statutes adopted by the state
through its solemn legislative body. The purpose of the threejudge device was to avoid ill-considered interference with state
statutes by the use of the federal injunctive power. This purpose
is left intact by Ex parte Poresky, since activity under the state
statute is not enjoined, and the complaint is dismissed for want
of jurisdiction. If anything, the solemnity of the state legislative enactments is added to by the Poresky decision. 56
whom the action was brought may dismiss it if the complaint does not state a case

within the jurisdiction of the District Court."
54. E.g., Patterson v. Hardin, 145 F. Supp. 299 (S.D. Ind. 1956) ; Bradley v.
Waterfront Commission, 130 F. Supp. 303 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) ; Sankstone v. Jarecki,
116 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1953) ; Blass v. Weigel, 85 F. Supp. 775 (D. N.J.
1949). See note 42 supra for cases there cited.

55. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
56. Several cases, relying on Ex parte Poresky, have established the right of
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Recent Race Relations Cases
Starting with the premise that a substantial constitutional
question must be presented for the formation of a three-judge
court, several recent race relations cases have created what
appears to be a new requirement for three-judge courts: that
the statute attacked be not clearly unconstitutional. This requisite seems to be predicated on a misapplication of the substantial
claim of unconstitutionality requirement. These cases, employing the same line of reasoning, have been decided in different
federal circuits.57 To facilitate the presentation and discussion
of the problem, only those cases decided in the fifth circuit will
be analyzed in the text. The questions raised are perhaps best
presented by a discussion of these cases in the order of their
decision.
In Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors5 8 a Negro plaintiff instituted a class action in the federal district court seeking an
injunction to require admission to Louisiana State University.
The plaintiff's prayer alleged the unconstitutionality of Louisiana state law as well as praying for injunctive relief. The onejudge district court took jurisdiction and decided the case solely
on the grounds of equal protection. No Louisiana statutes were
construed, but the court granted a temporary injunction, recognizing the separate-but-equal doctrine as valid law, but finding
that the facilities in Louisiana for Negroes did not meet the test
of substantially equal facilities. The court of appeals reversed, 59
the single judge to dismiss for want of jurisdictional amount.

E.g.,

Jacobs v.

Tawes, 250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957) ;Cooney v. Legg, 34 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Cal.
1940). ln addition, some single-judge courts have relied on the Poresky case to
dismiss for lack of equity jurisdiction. E.g., Priceman v. Dewey, 81 F. Supp. 557
(E.D. N.Y. 1949), 62 HARV. L. REV. 1398 (failure to show irreparable injury) ;
Farr v. O'Keefe, 27 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Miss. 1939) ("unclean hands") ; Pullen
v. Patton, 19 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Tex. 1937) (adequate remedy at law).
While the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Poresky can be justified for
reasons outlined in the text, these latter cases dismissing for lack of equity jurisdiction appear in direct conflict with the rule announced in the Metropolitan Water
and Northern cases. Lack of equity jurisdiction does not go to the power of the
district court as a federal court to hear and decide the case, but to the propriety
of granting the extraordinary relief afforded by equity.
57. Board of Supervisors of LSU v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958)
Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of LSU, 225 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958);
Garman v. Miami Transit Co., 151 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. Fla. 1957); Adkins v.
School Board of City of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957) ; Kelley
v. Board of Education of City of Nashville, 139 F. Supp. 578 (M.D. Tenn. 1956) ;
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1956) ; Willis
v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Ky. 1955).
58. 116 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. La. 1953).
59. 207 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1953).
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holding that the complaint required the convening of a threejudge court. While a petition for certiorari was pending before
the Supreme Court, the first decision in Brown v. Board of Education was handed down. G° Subsequently in a brief per curiam
opinion,6 1 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court
of appeals and remanded the case "for consideration in the light
6' 2
of the segregation cases . . .and conditions that now prevail.
On remand, the district court without taking new evidence again
granted a temporary injunction. The court of appeals affirmed,6 8
concluding that the Supreme Court by its actions had necessarily
held that the matter for consideration was within the jurisdiction of a single-judge district court. Judge Rives, in a separate
opinion, concurred in the result on the ground that a three-judge
court is authorized only when the claim of unconstitutionality
presents a substantial federal question. He felt that the federal question presented no longer required analysis and exposition for its decision and was therefore "frivolous."6 4 Judge
Cameron dissented on the ground that a three-judge court was
required. Conceding that where a substantial claim of unconstitutionality is not presented, the district court may dismiss for
want of jurisdiction, he concluded that such is "quite a different
course of action from the one here invited where a single district judge is called upon to strike down a state statute as unconstitutional. He has no jurisdiction to do this."6 5
The indefiniteness surrounding the Tureaud decision renders
uncertain its value as a statement of the proper rules concerning
the application of the three-judge court statute. The action by
the Supreme Court may indicate dissatisfaction with the stand
taken by the court of appeals on the three-judge court issue; on
the other hand the Supreme Court may have implied that the
plaintiff was entitled to relief in any event in light of the Brown
decision. The Tureaud decision is useful to the discussion here
only as the backdrop before which the problem in the subsequent
cases developed.
The rationale of Judge Rives' concurring opinion in the
Tureaud case was made the basis for decision in Bush v. Orleans
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
347 U.S. 971 (1954).
Ibid.
225 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 442.
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Parish School Board.6 In that case plaintiffs sought an injunction against officers of the public schools of Orleans Parish
alleging the unconstitutionality of the Louisiana Constitution 7
and statutory law68 relative to segregation as well as the Louisiana pupil assignment statute. 69 A three-judge court heard the
case initially and held that since under the Supreme Court's sec0
ond decision in Brown v. Board of Education"
the Louisiana
statutes and constitutional provisions were invalid insofar as
they required segregation in public schools, no substantial question of constitutionality was presented. Consequently the case
was not one for three judges, but should be decided by a single
7
district judge. The Supreme Court's ruling in Ex parte Poresky
was cited by the court as authority for its conclusion that a substantial question of constitutionality was required for the formation of a three-judge court.
The Bush decision clearly stands for the proposition that before a case must be heard by three judges it must appear that
the statute attacked is not clearly unconstitutional. Such a requisite is not expressly provided for in the three-judge court statute, nor had it been suggested or applied prior to the Tureaud
and Bush decisions. While practical considerations in the administration of three-judge courts may explain the reason for the
court's conclusion, it seems to this writer that the ruling in Ex
parte Poresky certainly does not stand for such a proposition.
The misapplication of the Poresky rule in the Bush case perhaps
results from the use of the words "substantial constitutional
question" in the Poresky decision.7 2 But in Poresky these words
were used to require that the claim of unconstitutionality be substantial; in other words, the claim of unconstitutionality must
not be frivolous or clearly untenable on its face. This was necessary to support the jurisdiction of the court. No such jurisdictional question is presented in the Bush case. This is evidenced
by the fact that the case was remanded to the federal district
court for decision. This would not have been possible under the
Poresky rule, since in the absence of a substantial claim of unconstitutionality the district court itself would have been with66. 138 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La. 1956).
67. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
68. La. Acts 1954, No. 555.
69. La. Acts 1954, No. 556.

70. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
71. 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
72. See note 18 supra.
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out jurisdiction, there being present no other federal question,
diversity of citizenship, or other ground for federal jurisdiction.
The procedure adopted in the Bush case would appear to be in
direct violation of the three-judge requirement. All of the requisites necessary for the formation of a three-judge court would
seem to the writer to be present, i.e., injunctive relief was sought
against the activity of state officers in enforcing a state statute
in a complaint which alleged a substantial claim of unconstitutionality. Yet the case was remanded to the district court for
decision on the merits. Such decision on the merits was 'express73
ly prohibited by the Metropolitan Water and Northern cases.
Although the rationale in Ex parte Poresky will not support the
Bush procedure, practical considerations in the administration of
three-judge courts identical with those underlying the Poresky
decision perhaps explain the court's conclusion. But even these
practical considerations do not seem to justify dispensing with
the three-judge requirement where the court clearly has jurisdiction. Congress was certainly aware of the additional administrative burden that would be imposed on the federal judicialry when
they enacted the three-judge court statute.7 4 This statute was
designed to serve as a psychological balm to assuage state ire
aroused by the Young decision and to prevent "unnecess ary conflict between federal and state authority always to be deprecated." 5 This legislative intent would seem to be directly avoided by a requirement that the statute attacked be not clearly unconstitutional.
The three-judge device was adopted in the belief that the
more careful consideration afforded each case when it was considered by three judges would minimize undue interferences
with state legislation by abuse of the federal injunction power.
It has long been the rule that the constitutionality of a state
statute will be presumed until the contrary is clearly established.7 6 The enactment of the three-judge court requirement
served to strengthen this presumption. 77 Under the Bush pro73. See notes 46 and 47 supra, and accompanying text.

74. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250 (1941) : "While Congress thus
sought to assure more weight and greater deliberation by not leaving the fate of
such litigation to a single judge, it was no less mindful that the requirement of
three
75.judges . . . entails a serious drain upon the federal judicial systen."

Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 260
U.S.
212, 216 (1922).
76. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) ; Life & Casualty Co. v. McCray,
291 U.S. 566 (1934).
77. Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941) : "The ciux of the
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cedure both of these safeguards for state legislative enactments
are avoided. In remanding the case to the district court, the
three-judge court indicates, without a full hearing on the merits,
the unconstitutionality of the statute. With this in mind the
district court is left to decide the unconstituionality of the statute on the merits as well as to issue the requested injunctive
relief. Such a procedure can hardly be said to be conducive to
the careful consideration of state statutes which the three-judge
requirement was designed to afford or to foster the healthy respect so much to be desired between federal and state authority.
This is especially true when, as in the Bush case, the injunction
granted by the district judge is not specific, but the state is left
to proceed "with all deliberate speed ' 7 8 in accomplishing that
which the statute sought to prevent. The possibility of future
litigation in the administration of the injunction is obvious, especially when the subject matter of 79the injunction is a matter of
such state concern as segregation.
Under the Bush decision a statute was said to be clearly unconstitutional when its unsoundness clearly appeared from previous Supreme Court decisions. The difficulty to be encountered in applying this test is further evidence of the danger
underlying the requirement that the statute be not clearly unconstitutional. Unless the statute attacked were identical with a
statute whose constitutionality had previously been adjudicated,
remand to the district court will result in a determination of the
constitutionality of the statute by that court for the first time on
the merits. Such a procedure was expressly prohibited by the
Metropolitan and Northern cases and would be clearly violative
of the three-judge requisite. This in effect happened in the Bush
so
case. The validity of the Louisiana pupil assignment statute
had not been specifically ruled upon prior to that decision. The
three-judge court preliminarily decided that it was unconstitutional because of the previous segregation cases. This left the
business [three-judge device] is procedural protection against an improvident statewide doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy. This was the aim of
Congress and this is the reconciling principle of the cases."
78. Bush v. New Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La.
1956).
79. But see Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward County, 142 F. Supp.
616 (E.D. Va. 1956), where it was held that a three-judge court was not required
to administer the injunction granted once the Supreme Court affirmed the threejudge court's initial declaration of unconstitutionality. It is interesting to note
that this case likewise concerned the constitutionality of a state segregation statute.
80. La. Acts 1954, No. 556.
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district court to decide for or against the constitutionality of the
statute on the merits.
At least one important question is left unanswered by the
Bush decision. It is interesting to conjecture what would be the
result if the state should carry the unwieldly burden thrust upon
it by the three-judge court's declaration that the statute is clearly unconstitutional and successfully convince the district judge
of the statute's validity. Technically speaking the district court
would seem to be without jurisdiction since the ground for remand by the three-judge court would have been eliminated. Conceivably the plaintiff might ultimately appeal to the Supreme
Court, only to find that the district court was without jurisdiction to try the case initially. The incongruity of such a result is
obvious.
8
In Ludley v. Board of Supervisors of L. S. U. 1 the requirement created by the Bush case that the statute be not clearly unconstitutional was applied one step further by the district court.
In that case the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the action of school
officials in enforcing two Louisiana statutes which were alleged
8 2
to be unconstitutional. The first of these statutes required a
certificate of eligibility signed by the parish superintendent of
education and by the principal of the high school from which the
applicant graduated, before the applicant could be admitted to
any publicly financed institution of higher learning. The second
statute8 3 provided for the removal from office of any permanent
public school teacher who advocated or performed any act furthering integration of the races within any public institution of
higher learning. The district court, relying on the Bush case, refused to convene the three-judge court requested by the defendant, and held the statutes unconstitutional on the merits. The
court of appeals8 4 concurred in the district court's refusal to convene a three-judge court on the ground that because of the Su5
preme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education no substantial question was presented.

This procedure appears open to greater criticism than was
directed at that adopted in the Bush case. Here there was no effort at compliance with the three-judge requirement. At least in
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

150
La.
La.
252
347

F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957).
Acts 1956, No. 15, LA. R.S. 17:2131-2135 (Supp. 1958).
Acts 1956, No. 249, LA. R.S. 17:443 (Supp. 1958).
F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958).
U.S. 483 (1954).
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the Bush case a three-judge court was initially convened, and it
decided that a three-judge court was not required. As in the
Bush case the constitutionality of the statute' under attack in
Ludley had not been previously adjudicated. This being so, the
district court, having decided preliminarily that a three-judge
court was not required because the statute was clearly unconstitutional, was left to dispose of the case for the first time on the
merits. Such a procedure is hardly in keeping with the legislative intent in enacting the three-judge requirement. Practical
considerations in the administration of three-judge courts may
explain this procedure but in the opinion of this writer certainly do not justify a refusal to apply the three-judge statute where
it was clearly applicable.
Stephen J. Ledet, Jr.

The Plight of the Attorney-Certified Public
Accountant-An Evaluation of a
Proposed Code of Conduct
In August 1958 a subcommittee' appointed by the American
Bar Association Committee on Professional Relations submitted
to its parent committee and to the National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants, a draft of a proposed
Code of Conduct dealing with problems of joint practice and
publicity by attorneys and certified public accountants practicing together, and persons possessing dual qualifications. No
action has as yet been taken by either committee concerning
this proposed Code, for it is desired that the members of both
professions be given time to study its provisions and consider
their probable effects.
The Proposed Code of Conduct divides the attorney-CPA
problem into four sections: (1) the lawyer employed by a CPA
firm, (2) the CPA employed by a law firm, (3) partnerships
between lawyers and CPAs and (4) the individual who possesses dual qualifications. This Comment will consider only the
fourth situation - the problems presented when an individual
2
is both a lawyer and a CPA.
1. This subcommittee was composed of four attorneys: Mr. William T. Gossett,
Dean Erwin N. Griswold, Mr. Louis Boxleitner, and Mr. George E. Brand.
2. No attempt will be made to provide a comprehensive review of the prior

